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Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations,
recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has
an optimal size depending on the project￿ s quality. This is a random variable with
a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding project leader observes its
realization. Any decision is only observed by the involved agents. The set of pure
strategy Sequential Equilibria is characterized by giving an algorithm that selects
one equilibrium at a time. An agent￿ s expected payo⁄ is related to his position in
the network, though no centrality measure in the literature captures this relation.
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11 Introduction
In this paper, the formation of start-up businesses is analyzed when entrepreneurs rely
on their social or business contacts in the early process of founding a company. It is im-
portant to understand this process better, to identify ine¢ ciencies and to remove them.
This would bene￿t economic growth which entrepreneurs foster. They innovate and im-
prove existing technologies. The economic literature on the impact of social networks in
labor markets is surveyed by Ioannides and Loury (2004). To analyze an entrepreneur￿ s
recruitment in a network theoretically is novel.1
In reality, entrepreneurs need, apart from funding, skilled and reliable people, such as
business contacts, friends and relatives. Br￿derl and Preisend￿rfer (1998) show empirically
that entrepreneurs which start a business in the region in which they grew up obtain more
and better support. Access to local networks and business contacts signi￿cantly improve
a start-up￿ s success probability. This is due to better information, existing contacts with
customers and suppliers, access to ￿nancing and an existent family and friends network
which provides emotional support and unpaid work. Michelacci and Silva (2007) show
empirically that locals have better access to funding and Blumberg and Pfann (2001) ￿nd
a positive relationship between an individual￿ s level of social capital and his decision to
become self-employed.
Those which join the entrepreneur may recruit friends or former colleagues. The team￿ s
growth is restricted by the network which captures social relations, if it runs out of money
(in this model there is a time limit) or if the business idea is poor. Moreover, other teams
may compete for the same individuals.
A stylized and dynamic model is developed. Di⁄erent stages of o⁄ers and replies are
called time periods and a last period limits the game. Each agent is either a player or
a project leader and the analysis focuses on two projects. Each project leader knows his
project￿ s quality, which in￿ uences the optimal number of contributors and each contrib-
utor￿ s payo⁄, while all other agents only know the prior distribution of project qualities.
The setup and each project￿ s location are commonly known.2
A unique Sequential Equilibrium is selected by letting the agents move sequentially
and breaking any agent￿ s indi⁄erence. To characterize the equilibrium is non-trivial since
it depends among other things on each player￿ s position in the network relative to that
of the projects. Ine¢ cient unemployment may prevail in equilibrium, sometimes because
the players try to extract information about the more distant project￿ s quality by waiting.
1A large sociological analysis of entrepreneurship in networks is based on Aldrich and Zimmer (1986).
2Although, as is discussed below, all results obtain under weaker informational assumptions.
2The players are categorized according to the number of o⁄ers they may receive. Addi-
tionally, the group of players with the highest expected payo⁄before the game is identi￿ed
and said to be most central. Conceptually related centrality measures generally yield dif-
ferent results, such as Freeman￿ s (1977) betweeness centrality and Burt￿ s (1992) structural
holes. A player has the highest betweeness centrality if he is on more paths between
two agents than any other player and information brokers which bridge a structural hole
between two groups of agents bene￿t most from exchange between them. Example 2
illustrates the stark di⁄erence between the three measures.
This paper is related with network formation games (see Jackson (2005) for a survey),
in which the static equilibrium concept of pairwise stability is used. In such games the
analysis is usually less complex than in this dynamic model in which each agent￿ s type and
location matter. For example, in Goyal and Vega-Redondo￿ s (2007) network formation
game each pair of directly or indirectly linked players creates a surplus. Intermediaries
on a path between two players pocket part of the surplus since they occupy a structural
hole. The stable network is a star, or a circle if the players are restricted to form a limited
number of links. Buskens and van der Rijt (2006) simulate a model in which each player
strives to take such an intermediate position and ￿nd that balanced complete bipartite
networks3 obtain. They conclude that no agent can occupy a structural hole if everyone
aspires to do so. The coalition formation literature uses similar ideas (see Ray (2008)
for a survey). Each subset of players generates a value which is distributed among its
members. A coalition is stable if no member wants to leave it and form a new one.
Bala and Goyal￿ s (1998) model has similar features as the one in this paper. They
study the relationship between network structure and social learning. Initially, players
do not know which action yields the highest payo⁄. Over time they observe the outcome
of their own and their neighbors￿choices. This yields a dynamic learning process. As
in this paper, players obtain information gradually over time and the informational re-
strictions are captured by a ￿xed network. In Stein (2008), each player has information
which is only valuable together with that obtained from his neighbors. Hence, a player￿ s
relative position in the network matters. By communication, underdeveloped ideas spread
throughout the network while valuable ones remain local. Conversely, in this paper, high
quality projects potentially spread further than those of low quality.
The game is de￿ned in the next section. Two examples are provided in section 3. In
section 4, equilibrium existence and uniqueness are established and illustrated in various
examples. The players are categorized based on the equilibrium. Moreover, a new cen-
3In such a network, there are two (polarized) sides each with the same number of agents; each agent
on one side is connected to all agents on the other side but to none on his.
3trality measure is derived and allocated to the network literature. Before concluding, the
model￿ s welfare implications as well as assumptions and possible extensions are discussed.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Game in a Network
The agents in ￿nite set A = f1;:::;ng dispose of a set of projects denoted by P = f1;2g:
The two project leaders take the ￿rst positions in A and belong to set PL; while the agents
which occupy positions 3 to n in A are players and belong to set I: Thus, A = PL[I: Let
project leader 1 obtain project 1 and project leader 2 project 2. If ￿ 2 PL is considered,
abusing notation, the other project leader is referred to as ￿￿:
Each agent has a ￿xed position in a network. Formally, the agents in A are nodes of
a network ￿; whose graph is de￿ned as the pair (A;E); where E ￿ A￿A denotes the set
of links between them. A link from agent i to agent j is denoted by (i;j): Graph (A;E)
is undirected, that is, for all i;j 2 A; (i;j) 2 E if, and only if, (j;i) 2 E:
Given network ￿; a path between two distinct agents i and j is de￿ned as a sequence
of distinct agents i1;:::;ir with i1 = i; ir = j; and (il￿1;il) 2 E; for all 1 < l ￿ r: Its
length is r ￿ 1: Let network ￿ be connected, that is, each agent is connected to at least
one other agent directly and to all others via paths of ￿nite lengths. The length of the
shortest path between two distinct agents i and j is called distance between i and j and
is denoted by dij: The largest distance (along shortest paths) between agent i and any
other agent in ￿ is de￿ned as di = max
j2A
dij: Finally, denote agent i￿ s set of direct neighbors
by i(1) = fj 2 A j dij = 1g; and for any 2 ￿ m ￿ di; de￿ne his set of m-neighbors as
i(m) = fj 2 A j dij ￿ mg: This set includes all agents at distance m or less from i:
Each project ￿ 2 P may be of high or low quality, denoted by kH
￿ and kL
￿; respectively.
Both are positive real numbers and kH
￿ > kL
￿:4 Let K￿ = fkL
￿;kH
￿ g and K = ￿￿2PK￿:
Each project￿ s quality is randomly and independently drawn before the game begins. A
project￿ s realized quality level is only observed by its leader. For each ￿ 2 P; nature
selects kH
￿ with probability p￿ 2 (0;1) and kL
￿ with complementary probability (1 ￿
p￿): The probabilities may vary across projects. Denote the commonly known vector of
probabilities with which each project￿ s quality is high by p = (p1;p2): Finally, denote by
k 2 K the vector of realized project qualities.
4For simplicity, the analysis focuses on the case of two quality levels per project. However, the
extension of this setup to more than two quality levels per project is straightforward.
4Following Harsanyi (1967-68), this game of incomplete information (about each
project￿ s quality, and as shown below, its payo⁄function) can be studied as one of imper-
fect information. By taking place in a network, the game becomes one of multiple stages
called time periods. They are denoted by t = 1;:::;T; with T ￿ 1 ￿xed exogenously. The
￿xed network ￿ including each player￿ s and project leader￿ s position as well as the game￿ s
setup are commonly known. Finally, let (￿;T;K;p) be the game￿ s tuple of parameters.
2.2 Strategies and History of the Game
Before the game begins, project leader ￿ 2 PL may reject his project. If he carries it out,
at t = 1; ￿ may o⁄er any neighbor except of ￿￿; that is, any j 2 ￿(1) n f￿￿g to join.
Formally, ￿￿ s action at t = 1 is de￿ned as f1
￿ 2 fo⁄er;no o⁄erg￿(1)nf￿￿g: Given f1
￿; the
set o1
￿ of players which are o⁄ered to join project ￿ at t = 1 is determined. It is empty if
￿ issues no o⁄ers. Only a player who receives an o⁄er observes it. He only knows from
which project it is but not the project￿ s quality or how many other players are asked.
Each player j 2 o1
￿ may accept or reject the o⁄er. His action is de￿ned as g1
j 2
fYes;Nog and is only observed by project leader ￿: If player j receives o⁄ers from both
projects at t = 1; his action is de￿ned as g1
j 2 f(Yes;No); (No;Yes); (No;No)g; that is, he
can at most join one project. If he receives no o⁄er at t = 1; g1
j = ;: After all players chose
a (possibly "empty") action and the corresponding project leader(s) observed them, the
second period starts. Each project leader may ask any unrecruited neighbor or a neighbor
of a player who joined him at t = 1: This determines o2
1 and o2
2: In general, denote the
set of players o⁄ered to join project ￿ at t by ot
￿: Any unrecruited player who receives an
o⁄er decides whether to accept it or not. He does not know the project￿ s quality, how
many other players are o⁄ered to join it or joined it already.
A player commits to a project forever (see section 5 for a discussion of this assumption).
Hence, if Yes 2 gs
j for any s ￿ 1; player j cannot choose Yes any more at any t; where
s < t ￿ T: He rejects any o⁄er from the other project leader and justi￿es his rejection￿
also if he receives two o⁄ers simultaneously.5 A project leader may reissue his o⁄er to any
player who rejected it before.6 This yields a dynamic process of o⁄ers and replies.
Denote player i￿ s private history at the end of period t by ht
i: It contains every o⁄er i
received with his reply at all 1 ￿ s ￿ t: A period￿ s history in which he received no o⁄er
is empty. For any project leader ￿ 2 PL and any t; ht
￿ contains all o⁄ers ￿ made and the
5A player￿ s action space thus changes once he accepted an o⁄er. This is not modelled formally, nor is
the justi￿cation the other project leader receives from a player who is not available any more.
6Project leaders do not use o⁄ers to obtain information about the other project￿ s quality. They simply
intend to ￿ll up their team on time and recruit well-connected players only for this purpose.
5replies he received at all 1 ￿ s ￿ t: Any player i￿ s and any project leader ￿￿ s history at
the beginning of the game are empty, that is, h0
i ￿ ; and h0
￿ ￿ ;; respectively.
Let F￿ denote the strategy set of any project leader ￿ 2 PL: It contains all sequences




￿ is conditional on ht￿1
￿ at any t: Let F = ￿￿2PLF￿ be the project leaders￿strategy space
with generic element f called (project leaders￿ ) strategy pro￿le. Similarly, denote by Gi
the strategy set of any player i 2 I: Each element of this set is a sequence of actions, called






i and the o⁄er(s) i receives at t: Let G = ￿i2IGi be the players￿strategy space with
generic element g called (players￿ ) strategy pro￿le. To emphasize player i￿ s and project
leader ￿￿ s role, g and f are written as (gi;g￿i) and (f￿;f￿￿); respectively.
2.3 Payo⁄ Function and Equilibrium Concept
Denote by b￿ the set of contributors of project ￿ 2 P and by jb￿j its cardinality. Project
leader ￿￿ s payo⁄ function is denoted by ￿￿(jb￿j;kq
￿): It is assumed to be strictly concave
in jb￿j and strictly increasing in kq
￿ for q 2 fL;Hg: To calculate his optimal number of
contributors jb￿
￿(q)j; he maximizes his payo⁄ function with respect to jb￿j:7 The solution
is the lowest nonnegative integer for which the payo⁄ is maximal. If kq
￿ enters the payo⁄




￿(L)j holds, unless both
are zero. Finally, for a given positive number of contributors up to the optimal one, a
high quality project yields its members a larger payo⁄ than one of low quality.
Given f and g; project ￿￿ s actual set of contributors is b￿(f;g): It contains ￿; unless it
is empty since even ￿ does not contribute himself. His payo⁄in this case is zero. Similarly,
player i￿ s payo⁄ is zero if i = 2 [￿2Pb￿(f;g): Denote project leader ￿￿ s realized payo⁄ by
￿￿(f;g) ￿ ￿￿(jb￿(f;g)j;kq
￿): The realized payo⁄ of any j 2 b￿(f;g) is the same as ￿￿ s.8





￿1(f;g); if i 2 b1(f;g);
￿2(f;g); if i 2 b2(f;g);
0; otherwise.
If i 2 b￿(f;g); player i￿ s payo⁄is sometimes written as ￿i(jb￿(f;g)j;kq
￿): Any agent￿ s payo⁄
function maps F ￿ G into R: All agents observe their payo⁄ only at the end of period T:
7Since ￿ contributes to his own project, he requires one player less than jb￿
￿(q)j for q 2 fL;Hg:
8To assume equal sharing of a project￿ s payo⁄ is certainly restrictive. However, to allow for di⁄erent
sharing rules, for bargaining or for wage posting is left for future research since it is not straightforward.
6At any 1 ￿ t ￿ T; all agents use expected payo⁄s. To calculate them they form beliefs
about each project￿ s quality. When the game begins, agent j￿ s belief ￿0
j is identical to the
common prior p except of the ￿th entry of project leader ￿￿ s belief ￿0
￿ which is 1 if ￿￿ s




i (in a way explained below). Both are elements of f0;p1;1g ￿ f0;p2;1g:
At any t; ￿t




i and the o⁄er(s) i receives at t: Project
leaders update beliefs analogously. Finally, let ￿t = f￿t
1;:::;￿t
ng:
For any t; given f; g and ￿t
￿; denote the payo⁄￿ expects to receive at T by ~ ￿t
￿(f;g): It
is the weighted sum (by ￿t
￿) of his payo⁄ at T in case project ￿￿￿ s quality is low or high,
respectively. A player￿ s expected payo⁄ after joining a project is calculated analogously,
that is, he weights his payo⁄ at T for each of the four pairs of realized project qualities
by his belief ￿t
i: Any unrecruited player determines which project he may still join until T
and his corresponding payo⁄, conditional on the realized project quality. He then weights
the four payo⁄ functions by his belief. Denote any player i￿ s expected payo⁄ at any t by
~ ￿t
i(f;g) and by ~ ￿0
j(f;g) the expected payo⁄ of any agent j 2 A before the game begins.
Given (￿;T;K;p); de￿ne the Team Formation Game (TFG) as the tuple (A;F;G;￿);
where ￿ = (￿1(f;g);:::;￿n(f;g)): A Sequential Equilibrium (SE) strategy pro￿le requires
each agent to have an optimal action at any 1 ￿ t ￿ T given any history and his belief.
In particular, the continuation strategy must be sequentially rational after any history
for the remainder of the TFG: The system of beliefs consistent with the strategy pro￿le
is not de￿ned formally since it is very simple: on a SE path, each agent at most updates
his belief about each project￿ s quality once (when it is revealed to him).9
De￿nition 1. Given (￿;T;K;p) and any Team Formation Game (A;F;G;￿); a Sequen-
tial Equilibrium is a pair of strategy pro￿les (f;g) such that at any 1 ￿ t ￿ T;
i) for all ￿ 2 PL; ￿t￿1
￿ ; ht￿1
￿ and ^ f￿ 2 F￿; given kq
￿ for any q 2 fL;Hg;
~ ￿t
￿(f;g) ￿ ~ ￿t
￿( ^ f￿;f￿￿;g); and




i and ^ gi 2 Gi;
~ ￿t
i(f;g) ￿ ~ ￿t
i(f; ^ gi;g￿i) provided that Yes = 2 gs
i for all s < t:
After accepting an o⁄er player i￿ s strategy is trivial. As is shown below, a pure strategy
SE exists in any TFG: It is found using sequential rationality (SR). At each 1 ￿ t ￿ T;
the agents move in increasing order of their indexes, that is, ￿rst project leaders 1 and
9On out of equilibrium paths, an agent may update his belief more often. This is feasible since each
agent always puts a positive belief on any history. After any "strange" observation which an agent cannot
attribute to one type of project leader, his (updated) belief about this project￿ s quality is the prior p￿:
71 3 4 2
Figure 1: Four Players on a Line
2, and then players 3 to n: A player which receives no o⁄er, obviously, takes no decision.
While the results are unchanged if project leaders move simultaneously, the sequentiality
of the players￿moves together with breaking any agent￿ s indi⁄erence allows to select a
unique SE; as is shown in section 4.
3 Two Examples
3.1 Example 1: A Simple Coordination Game
Let project leaders 1 and 2, and players 3 and 4 be organized on a line as depicted in
Figure 1. Let T = 2; kH
￿ = 1; kL
￿ = 2




2jb￿j2 for ￿ 2 P
and q 2 fL;Hg;10 hence, jb￿
￿(H)j = 3 and jb￿
￿(L)j = 2:11
A player￿ s decision at T = 2 is determined by SR. In case he is o⁄ered to join the
more distant project, he updates his belief about its quality to 1. If he receives two o⁄ers
(since he did not join his project leader neighbor at t = 1 while the other player did) he
thus joins the more distant (high quality) project, he accepts the single o⁄er his project
leader neighbor makes (since this yields him a higher payo⁄than his outside option of 0),
or he cannot take any decision if he joined him already at t = 1 (apart from rejecting a
second o⁄er he may receive).
At t = 1; in a SE; each project leader o⁄ers his neighbor to join.12 Conditional on
recruiting him, the project leader asks the other player at T = 2 if, and only if, his
project￿ s quality is high. At t = 1; the players coordinate13 on one project, that is, one of
them waits and the other accepts his neighbor￿ s o⁄er. The player which waits hopes to
join the more distant project in case its quality is high. Otherwise, he can still join his
10Each player contributes 3 times the project quality units to the payo⁄of every j 2 b￿ and causes a cost,
for example, due to the coordination e⁄ort, which increases exponentially in the number of contributors.
11Throughout this paper, both projects￿payo⁄ functions take this form, and thus are identical. How-
ever, the general result is valid for any pair of payo⁄ functions which ful￿ll the assumptions made above.
12The leader of a low quality project is indi⁄erent to ask his neighbor at t = 1 (and T = 2) or only at
T = 2: However, by assumption, he asks his neighbor at t = 1 (see Assumption 1 below).
13In this paper, the expression coordination is used to describe a situation in which a group of players
intends to join the same project even if some of them are closer to the other project.
8project leader neighbor at T = 2: A player who joins a project at t = 1 hopes that its
leader recruits the other player in case the project￿ s quality is high.
The player which waits obtains a higher expected payo⁄. With probability 1
2 the
more distant project￿ s quality is high and the player￿ s payo⁄is 4.5. With complementary
probability of 1
2; the player joins his project leader neighbor at T = 2: Since this project￿ s
quality is high or low with equal probability as well, the player obtains a payo⁄ of 4 or
2, respectively, each with compound probability of 1
4: Hence, a player￿ s expected payo⁄





4 and it is 1
22 + 1
24:5 = 13
4 if he accepts his o⁄er at
t = 1 (and the other player waits). A player which waits bene￿ts from the other project
if its quality is high. If it is not, he has a second chance to join a high quality project. In
case both players accept or reject their neighbors￿o⁄ers at t = 1; both end up in di⁄erent
teams and obtain a lower expected payo⁄of 1
22+ 1
24 = 12
4 : In the unique SE; player 3 waits
at t = 1 since waiting yields a higher payo⁄ and he can choose to wait or not because he
moves ￿rst. Player 4 joins project 2 at t = 1 by SR since he moves second. If project 2￿ s
quality is high, the teams f1g;f2;3;4g form. Otherwise, the teams f1;3g;f2;4g emerge:
player 4 joins project 1 at t = 1 and player 3 project 2 at T = 2:
Given the unique SE; the agents￿beliefs are derived. Project leader ￿￿ s belief about
project ￿￿￿ s quality is identical to the prior always. At t = 1; he has no other information
than the prior. At T = 2; before he moves, he only observed his neighbor￿ s reply to his
o⁄er at t = 1; which reveals nothing about project ￿￿￿ s quality.
At t = 1; each player￿ s belief about the projects￿quality levels is identical to the prior
(even if he receives no o⁄er from his project leader neighbor). At T = 2; a player updates
his belief about the more distant project￿ s quality to 1 if, and only if, he receives an o⁄er
to join it. Otherwise, player 4￿ s belief is identical to the prior. If player 3 is not asked
to join project 2 at T = 2 (since its leader did not ask player 4 at t = 1 or player 3 at
T = 2); he updates his belief about its quality to 0.
3.2 Example 2: The Illusion to be most "Powerful"
Suppose that the agents in A = f1;:::;6g form the network depicted in Figure 2, that
kH
￿ = 2; kL
￿ = 1; ￿￿(jb￿j;kq
￿) = 3kq
￿jb￿j ￿ 1
2jb￿j2 for ￿ 2 P and T = 3; then, jb￿
￿(H)j = 6
and jb￿
￿(L)j = 3: At ￿rst sight, player 4 has the best position. He is linked to three players
and both project leaders may compete for him. He ￿lls a structural hole and has the
highest betweeness centrality (together with player 3) with respect to the two project
leaders. Nevertheless, as is shown now, in the unique SE his expected payo⁄ is lowest





Figure 2: Network in Example 2
Given any quality level, project leader 1 needs to recruit at least two players. Hence,
he o⁄ers player 3 and (if possible) 4 to join. Provided they join him on time, he asks
players 5 and 6 if, and only if, his project￿ s quality is high. Project leader 2 tries to recruit
all players as well if, and only if, his project￿ s quality is high. In case it is low, he only
asks players 5 and 6. Their strategies are identical if it is assumed that no player delays
his decision out of indi⁄erence (see Assumption 1 in section 4). Player 4 is not asked to
join project 2 if its quality is low. He updates his belief about its quality to 1 if, and only
if, he receives an o⁄er to join it which he accepts.
For player 3 to join project 1 at t = 1 strictly dominates to join it at t = 2 since he
gives up his chance to join project 2 anyway but prevents project leader 1 from reaching
players 5 and 6. Hence, he either joins it at t = 1 or decides at T = 3: In the ￿rst case,
he hopes that project 1￿ s quality is high and that players 5 and 6 are recruited; in the
second, he hopes to join project 2 at T = 3; though he still may join project 1.
3.2.1 The Equal Likelihood Case
Thus far, the probability with which each project￿ s quality is high was not used. In order
to proceed, let p = (1
2; 1
2): Due to the network￿ s geography, an o⁄er from the more distant
project leader may reach players 3, 5 and 6 only at T = 3: Each of them, provided he
is still available, would accept it (since he updates his belief about the project￿ s quality
to 1). In case it is not made, the player joins his project leader neighbor at T = 3: The
three players receive a higher expected payo⁄ if they coordinate on one project. If player
3 joins project 1 at t = 1; players 5 and 6 decide only at T = 3: Conversely, if player
3 waits until T = 3; players 5 and 6, as assumed before, both join project 2 at t = 1:
Hence, player 4 receives at most a single o⁄er at t = 2 and accepts it in order to let the
corresponding project leader access the player(s) on his other side.
Player 3￿ s expected payo⁄ in case he waits is 12.25 while player 4￿ s is 8.75 and that
of 5 and 6 is 11. Their expected payo⁄ is 13.25 if they wait while that of 3 and 4 is 11.
10At t = 1; in the unique SE; player 3 waits since he moves ￿rst, and by SR, players 5
and 6 join project 2. Player 3 joins project 2 at T = 3 if o⁄ered and otherwise project
1. Player 4 is worst o⁄ in the SE since he remains unrecruited if project 2￿ s quality is
low. Although he ￿lls a structural hole and has the highest betweeness centrality, in the
unique SE; players 3, 5 and 6 "take away his power."
3.2.2 Changes in the Time Parameter and the Quality Probabilities
If T > 3; player 3 would wait until period T ￿ 1 for an o⁄er to join project 2. If it is not
made, he joins project 1. This prevents players 5 and 6 from receiving project 1￿ s o⁄er.14
By SR and since they do not delay their decision, they join project 2 at t = 1 (though
they are indi⁄erent to join it at any 1 ￿ s ￿ T ￿ 3): Player 4 joins project 2, if o⁄ered,
at t = 2 or accepts project 1￿ s o⁄er at T: Player 3 joins project 2 at t = 3 or project 1 at
T ￿ 1: Player 4￿ s payo⁄ then equals player 3￿ s.15
Let T = 3 again and consider changes in ^ p = p1 = p2; the probability with which
each project￿ s quality is high. Denote by g0 and g00 the players￿strategy pro￿les in which
they coordinate on project 1 and 2, respectively. Player 3 chooses to wait or not since he
moves ￿rst, and players 5 and 6, by SR, join or wait, respectively. Player i￿ s payo⁄ if he
joins project ￿ is ￿i(jb￿(f;g)j;kq
￿) for q 2 fL;Hg and g 2 fg0;g00g: The project leaders￿
strategy pro￿le f is identical in both cases. Player 3 waits until T = 3 if g00 is played and
joins project 1 at t = 1 under g0: Since he moves ￿rst, in the unique SE; he is better o⁄
to wait (since the other side joins) than to join (since the other side waits) if, and only if,
^ p ￿3(jb2(f;g00)j;kH
2 ) + (1 ￿ ^ p) ^ p ￿3(jb1(f;g00)j;kH
1 ) + (1 ￿ ^ p) (1 ￿ ^ p) ￿3(jb1(f;g00)j;kL
1 ) ￿
^ p ￿3(jb1(f;g0)j;kH
1 ) + (1 ￿ ^ p) ￿3(jb1(f;g0)j;kL
1 ):
Obviously, ^ p￿i(jb1(f;g0)j;kH
1 ) = ^ p￿i(jb2(f;g00)j;kH
2 ) for all i 2 I and it cancels on both
sides. Then, (1 ￿ ^ p) drops out of the inequality as well. This yields
^ p ￿3(jb1(f;g00)j;kH
1 ) + (1 ￿ ^ p) ￿3(jb1(f;g00)j;kL





1 ) ￿ ￿3(jb1(f;g00)j;kL
1 )
￿3(jb1(f;g00)j;kH
1 ) ￿ ￿3(jb1(f;g00)j;kL
1 )
: (1)
14If player 3 joined project 1 before T ￿1; players 5 and 6 would wait to decide until project 1￿ s quality
is revealed to them. Obviously, this is not part of a SE given the players￿￿xed order of moves.
15If player 3 joins project 1 only at T; his expected payo⁄ is larger than player 4￿ s.
11The numerator and denominator of (1) are nonnegative. This equation is derived in
a general way since it holds analogously for players 5 and 6 (however, substituting the
players￿and projects￿indexes, g0 with g00 and vice versa). Using (1), the range of ^ p can
be calculated for which each side prefers to wait if the other side joins. For player 3 the
threshold value of ^ p is 4:5￿4
10￿4 = 1
12 and it is 4:5￿4:5
13￿4:5 = 0 for players 5 and 6. For ^ p 2 (0; 1
12);
in the unique SE; player 3 prefers to join project 1 at t = 1; while for all larger values of
^ p he waits. Since ^ p is larger than zero, players 5 and 6 always prefer to wait rather than
to join project 2 at t = 1;16 though they best-reply to player 3￿ s choice since he moves
￿rst.17 Moreover, both sides never wait or join simultaneously for any ^ p 2 (0;1):
4 Equilibrium in any Team Formation Game
Although the ￿xed order of moves eliminates many equilibria, frequently, the agents out of
indi⁄erence have various possible equilibrium strategies. In order to select a unique SE;
two more assumptions are made. Assumption 1 (A1) states that no agent "unnecessarily"
delays his decision and was already introduced in Examples 1 and 2.
Assumption 1. A player which at most receives one o⁄er (possibly from some point in
time on) immediately accepts it. A project leader recruits in a circular cascade, if possible.
The behavior implied by A1 arises also if there is a small waiting cost, each agent￿ s
payo⁄is discounted over time, or T is a random variable and with a small probability any
period before T is the last one. A1 implies that a project leader o⁄ers any player to join
which previously was not accessible until his project is ￿lled or T is reached and imposes
players not to delay their decision out of indi⁄erence to join a project now or later.18
Given A1; suppose that at a distance up to T from each project there are less or just
enough players to ￿ll it if its quality is low and that no player is competed for by both
projects, that is, 1(T) \ 2(T) = ;: Then, each agent￿ s SE strategy is unique as is shown
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Given (￿;T;K;p) and any TFG; suppose that A1 holds. Then, there is
a unique SE ( _ f; _ g); if j￿(T)j ￿ jb￿
￿(L)j ￿ 1 for all ￿ 2 PL and 1(T) \ 2(T) = ;:
Proof. Given any TFG; suppose that A1 holds, and assume that j￿(T)j ￿ jb￿
￿(L)j￿1 for
all ￿ 2 PL and that 1(T)\2(T) = ;: Then, each project leader ￿￿ s optimal strategy _ f￿ is
16For low values of ^ p; players 5 and 6 by joining project 2 at T = 3 form a three-agent team while
player 3 is left with project leader 1 only, in case he waits and project 2￿ s quality is low.
17If players 5 and 6 moved ￿rst, they would wait and player 3 would join project 1 at t = 1:
18The agents￿behavior also arises when the informational assumptions are relaxed (see section 5).
12to recruit in a circular cascade, that is, at t = 1 he asks his direct neighbors, conditional
on receiving positive answers, at t = 2; he asks his second-neighbors and so on. Finally, at
T he o⁄ers all players at distance T from him to join (conditional on having recruited all
closer players before). Each player i 2 I receives at most one o⁄er since 1(T)\2(T) = ;:
His optimal strategy _ gi is to accept it immediately. A1 ensures uniqueness since project
leaders and players do not delay their decision.
If A1 does not hold, a unique SE obtains under all other conditions in Proposition
1 only if the agents form a tree, a circle or a line. Otherwise, more equilibria arise if a
player, by delaying his decision to join a project, does not obstruct its leader￿ s access to
players at a larger distance. Similarly, a project leader could initially bypass a player if
this does not prevent his access to players at a larger distance. If he recruits all bypassed
players on time, this is a SE ruled out by A1:
If jb￿
￿(H)j￿1 ￿ j￿(T)j; but all other conditions in Proposition 1 hold, project leader ￿￿ s
strategy need not be unique. At each distance there are either less, more or just enough
players such that together with all players at all lower distances his project is ￿lled. If at
some distance there are just enough players to ￿ll it, uniqueness obtains under A1 which
prescribes project leaders to recruit closer players before more distant ones. However,
should a project leader reach a distance at which there are more players to ￿ll his project,
then he is indi⁄erent which to ask. Each would accept his o⁄er since the other project is
too far away (that is, since 1(T) \ 2(T) = ;): In this case, Assumption 2 (A2) applies.
Assumption 2. A player which is indi⁄erent between two projects joins (or aspires to
join) the lower indexed project. In case of being indi⁄erent, project leader 1 asks lower
indexed players and project leader 2 higher indexed players.
A2 is a selection criterion for an agent who has various payo⁄-equivalent options.
Alternatively, the agents can be assumed to have lexicographic preferences over all teams
that may form in case of being indi⁄erent. An immediate corollary of Proposition 1 and
the discussion thereafter is stated next.
Corollary 1. Given (￿;T;K;p) and any TFG; suppose that A1 and A2 hold. Then, there
is a unique SE ( ~ f; ~ g); if 1(T) \ 2(T) = ;:
The assumption that projects do not compete for players, made in Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1, need not hold, such as in Examples 1 and 2. A project leader￿ s SE strategy,
given A1 and A2 in case 1(T) \ 2(T) 6= ; and ot
1 \ ot
2 6= ; for some 1 ￿ t ￿ T; is strictly
dominant and the players￿best-reply is unique as is shown in Proposition 2.
13Proposition 2. Given (￿;T;K;p) and any TFG; suppose that A1 and A2 hold. Then,
there is a unique SE (f￿;g￿):
Proof. The proof is divided into two parts. Part I shows that each project leader ￿ has
a strictly dominant strategy f￿
￿ 2 F￿; provided that A1 and A2 hold. Part II shows that
the players￿best-reply g￿ 2 G is unique. Together this yields the unique SE:
Part I. Given (￿;T;K;p) and any TFG; suppose that A1 and A2 hold. Then, project
leader ￿￿ s strictly dominant strategy given jb￿
￿(q)j; for q 2 fL;Hg; is as follows. By A1;
￿ o⁄ers any player he can access to join unless T is reached, his project is ￿lled or all
accessible players join(ed) project ￿￿: By A2; ￿ uniquely selects the players he asks if
more than required are accessible and he is indi⁄erent which to ask; ￿ is not indi⁄erent if
a player rejects his o⁄er in order to wait for ￿￿￿ s o⁄er. In this case, ￿ does not reissue his
o⁄er to this player if, and only if, the player may reject it again and ￿ can access enough
other players to ￿ll his project which (he expects will) join him. Finally, A1 implies that
a project leader never resumes to issue o⁄ers once he stopped. This yields f￿ 2 F:
Part II. Given f￿ 2 F; at any t; the set of unrecruited players is partitioned in categories
0, 1 and 2 as follows. Players in category 0 never receive an o⁄er. Players in category
1 may at most receive one o⁄er and players in category 2 may receive o⁄ers from both
projects. At any s; where t < s ￿ T; the groups￿composition may change. A player
drops from category 2 to category 1 if he loses the option to join one of the two projects,
either because it is too far away to reach him on time or because he updates his belief
about its quality to 0. Similarly, a player may drop to category 0. Players which accept
an o⁄er are not categorized any more.
Players in category 0 never take a decision. By A1; those in category 1 immediately
accept the only o⁄er they may receive. The players in category 2 closest to each of the
two projects calculate their expected payo⁄ of waiting and joining (given that the other
side waits or joins, respectively). The players coordinate on one project if one side waits
and the other joins. If both join, the players one distance further away from each project
calculate their expected payo⁄ and decide whether to join or to wait given the other
group￿ s behavior. Both groups may also wait for some time (until at least one project￿ s
quality is revealed to them). A player￿ s indi⁄erence to wait or to join is broken by A2 and
the order of moves together with SR reduces any remaining equilibrium multiplicity.
Given any TFG; the players can be categorized at any t; taking into account their
position in ￿ relative to that of the two projects and each agent￿ s equilibrium strategy.





Figure 3: A Tree with Origin in Project Leader 2
Corollary 2. Given (￿;T;K;p) and any TFG; suppose that A1 and A2 hold. Then, at
any 1 ￿ t ￿ T; each player i 2 I is uniquely allocated to one category.
Obviously, Corollary 2 also applies to the categorization before the game begins. This
is the basis to identify a new centrality measure in the next subsection. Since the players
do not know the realized project qualities when the game begins, for every k 2 K; the
corresponding equilibrium path is derived. Each player which may never join a project
is allocated to category 0 when the game begins. A player which may join both projects,
possibly in di⁄erent realizations of the project qualities, is allocated to category 2, denoted
by C0
2 and all other players belong to category 1, denoted by C0
1:
Since for k = (kH
1 ;kH
2 ) the projects￿extension is largest, this case serves to identify a
subset of the competed for players in C0
2: Each project leader ￿ 2 PL counts the players
at distances 1, 2 and so on from him until his high quality project is ￿lled. Formally,
given jb￿
￿(H)j; for each ￿ 2 PL let m￿ be the distance such that j￿(m￿)j ￿ jb￿
￿(H)j ￿ 1;
but j￿(m￿ ￿ 1)j < jb￿
￿(H)j ￿ 1; disregarding any path that includes project leader ￿￿:
Distance m￿ is equal to project leader ￿￿ s largest distance d￿ if there are less players than
jb￿
￿(H)j in the network and ￿￿ does not obstruct ￿￿ s access to any of them. In Figure 3
with jb￿
1(H)j ￿ 2; for example, m1 = 1 since project leader 1 can only access player 3. If
j￿(m￿)j > jb￿
￿(H)j￿1; project leader ￿ selects the players at distance m￿ by A2: Since the
recruitment is time constrained and T may be smaller than m￿; let ^ m￿ = minfT;m￿g:
Slightly abusing notation, denote the set of players project leader ￿ would like to ask
if project ￿￿ s quality is high by ￿(^ m￿(H)): Any player in this set expects to receive ￿￿ s
o⁄er with positive probability before the game begins. Analogously, allocate all players
which ￿ll ￿ if its quality is low to ￿(^ m￿(L)); again abusing notation. This set is a strict
subset of ￿(^ m￿(H)); unless T limits ￿￿ s recruitment or he cannot access enough players.
Players in the intersection of 1(^ m1(H)) and 2(^ m2(H)) expect to receive o⁄ers from both
projects before the game begins and are allocated to a subset of C0
2; namely to
C0
2:1 = fi 2 I j i 2 1(^ m1(H)) \ 2(^ m2(H))g:
15The SE is trivial if C0
2:1 = ;: Then, Corollary 1 holds and C0
2 = ;: Each player receives
at most one o⁄er and accepts it immediately. If each project￿ s quality is high and C0
2:1 6= ;;
then there are not enough players in sets 1(^ m1(H)) and 2(^ m2(H)) to ￿ll both of them and
at least one project leader needs to ask more distant players, provided he can access them
on time. Therefore, category C0
2 may contain other players than those in C0
2:1: The players
in C0
2:1 "closest" to each project are called barrier players since they (may have to) decide
whether a project leader gains access to the players in C0
2:1 and thus (may) constitute a
barrier for him. For each ￿ 2 P; de￿ne the set of barrier players as
BP￿ = fi 2 C0
2:1 j d￿i = 1 or d￿i = d￿j + 1 for some j 2 i(1) s.t. j 2 I n C0
2:1g:
Unless BP￿ is a singleton, d￿i 6= d￿i0 may hold for i;i0 2 BP￿: One project leader may
reach his barrier player(s) faster than the other. All players in ￿ belong to C0
2 ￿ C0
2:1 if,
such as in Examples 1 and 2, jIj ￿ min￿2PL jb￿
￿(H)j; m￿ ￿ T; and both project leaders
can access all players. Then, each project leader￿ s barrier players are his neighbors.
To provide an algorithm for the categorization at any 1 ￿ t ￿ T is involved and does
not yield additional insights. In general, the players need not coordinate on one project
(immediately), and hence, anything may occur. This is illustrated in Example 3 below.
Other examples of the categorization and the unique SE are provided in section 4.2.
4.1 A New Centrality Measure
In this subsection, the players with the highest (ex ante) expected payo⁄ are identi￿ed.
De￿nition 2. Given (￿;T;K;p) and any TFG; suppose that A1 and A2 hold. Any player
i 2 I with the highest (ex ante) expected payo⁄ is said to be most central.
Frequently, several players are most central. Although other centrality measures also
identify groups of players as most central, usually the group￿ s size is ￿xed exogenously
before its members are determined.19 In this model, the group￿ s size is endogenous: all
players with the highest expected payo⁄ given the unique SE (f￿;g￿) are most central.
If the players coordinate on one project, their expected payo⁄ can be calculated and
compared, and thus the most central players identi￿ed. Suppose that the players coordi-
nate on project 1 and project 2￿ s barrier players wait until project 1￿ s quality is revealed
to them. (In case the players coordinate on project 2 just relabel the projects￿indexes.)
19In chapter 5 of Wasserman and Faust (1994), it is shown how various measures which identify a single
most central player extend to group centrality.















2 ) 6= 0; player j in BP2 joins project 2 even if both projects￿quality is
low and his expected payo⁄is larger than any player i￿ s who joins project 2 in any case (and
only receives the second term p2 ￿i(b2(f￿;g￿);kH
2 )+(1￿p2) ￿i(b2(f￿;g￿);kL
2 ) as expected
payo⁄). Any player i 2 1(^ m1(L)) receives an expected payo⁄ of p1 ￿i(b1(f￿;g￿);kH
1 ) +
(1 ￿ p1) ￿i(b1(f￿;g￿);kL
1 ): This is strictly smaller than the expected payo⁄ of player j if
￿i(b1(f￿;g￿);kL
1 ) < p2 ￿j(b2(f￿;g￿);kH
2 ) + (1 ￿ p2) ￿j(b2(f￿;g￿);kL
2 ):
All barrier players of project 2 for which this conditions holds have the highest expected
payo⁄. If the inequality is reversed, any player i 2 1(^ m1(L)) has the highest expected
payo⁄ and if it holds with equality, both groups of players are most central.
If ￿j(b2(f￿;g￿);kL
2 ) = 0 in (2), the players in BP2 are recruited only if at least one
project￿ s quality is high. Any player i 2 ￿(^ m￿(L)); for ￿ 2 P; has an expected payo⁄ of
p￿ ￿i(b￿(f￿;g￿);kH
￿ ) + (1 ￿ p￿) ￿i(b￿(f￿;g￿);kL
￿) and again, the players whose expected
payo⁄ is largest are identi￿ed and declared most central.
In general, the analysis is not as simple as suggested here since the most central players
may belong to di⁄erent categories at the beginning of the game. Moreover, the barrier
players may not coordinate on a project or only after some time (see Example 3 below).
This centrality measure￿ s predictions are illustrated for various examples in section 4.2
and compared with those of existing concepts in the literature in section 4.3.
4.2 Examples of the Categorization
In various examples, the categorization of players before the game begins is illustrated
and the most central players are identi￿ed. Therefore, the unique SE is obtained.
4.2.1 Example 3: The optimal strategy of barrier players
In Examples 1 and 2, the two groups of barrier players coordinate their behavior. Example
3 provides two instances in which this is not the case. First, both groups of barrier players
do not wait for an o⁄er from the more distant project, that is, coordination does not take
place. Second, both groups of barrier players wait (at least for some time).





￿ = 1 and ￿￿(jb￿j;kq
￿) = 3kq
￿jb￿j ￿ 1
2jb￿j2 for ￿ 2 P; then, jb￿
￿(H)j = 5 and jb￿
￿(L)j = 3:
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Figure 4: Both groups of Barrier Players do not wait





Figure 5: Both groups of Barrier Players wait initially
In the unique SE; players 3 to 6 and 9 to 12 can only receive one o⁄er and accept it
immediately; they belong to C0
1: Barrier players 7 and 8 belong to C0
2 ￿ C0
2:1: Only player
7￿ s strategy is analyzed since his position in ￿ is symmetric to 8￿ s. If he joins project 1 at
t = 1; his expected payo⁄is 2
34:5+ 1
312:5 = 71
6: If he waits until t = 2; he is o⁄ered to join
project 1 again if, and only if, its quality is high. (Otherwise, project leader 1 asks player
5.) If the players coordinate on project 2, player 7 is asked to join it at t = 2 if, and only if,






at t = 1; players 7 and 8 in the SE join projects 1 and 2, respectively, and coordination
does not take place. Players 6 to 9 receive an expected payo⁄of 71
6 and are most central.




￿ = 1 and ￿￿(jb￿j;kq
￿) = 3kq
￿jb￿j ￿ 1
2jb￿j2 for ￿ 2 P; then, jb￿
￿(H)j = 21 and jb￿
￿(L)j = 3:
In the unique SE; only the strategy of barrier players 21 and 22 is interesting. Player 21
is asked to join project 1 at t = 1: This o⁄er is repeated at t = 2 if, and only if, project
1￿ s quality is high. (If it is low its leader asks player 3 by A2:) The reasoning for player 22
is analogous. Both prefer to join the same high quality project. Since they wait at t = 1;
they coordinate on project 1 (by A2) from t = 2 on and player 21 joins it if o⁄ered. At
t = 3; player 22 either accepts project leader 1￿ s o⁄er or joins project 2 if o⁄ered. Player
21 could then be included in project 2 at T = 4:
A barrier player￿ s expected payo⁄ from joining his project leader neighbor at t = 1 is
1
104:5 + 9








Figure 6: The "boiling soup pot"
of them wait until the projects￿qualities are revealed to them, both join the same high
quality project with probability 0.99 and receive a payo⁄of 0 with probability 0.01. Their
expected payo⁄ in this case is 218.295 which is strictly larger than 198.9. Since no other
player has the option to join both projects, the two barrier players are most central.
4.2.2 Example 4: The "boiling soup pot"
In the network depicted in Figure 6, assumption A2 breaks the symmetry between players
3 and 4 and makes player 4 most central. Let T = 2; p1 = p2; kH
￿ = 4
3; kL




2jb￿j2 for ￿ 2 P; hence, jb￿
￿(H)j = 4; jb￿
￿(L)j = 3 and ^ m￿ = 1 for
￿ 2 PL: Players 3 and 4 who belong to C0
2:1 are barrier players of both projects. Player 6
is in C0
2 as well and players 5 and 7 belong to C0
1:
In the unique SE; at t = 1; project leader 1 asks players 3 (by A2) and 5 in any case,
and additionally o⁄ers player 4 to join if, and only if, project 1￿ s quality is high. Similarly,
project leader 2 asks players 4 (by A2) and 7 in any case, and additionally 3 if, and only
if, project 2￿ s quality is high. Players 5 and 7 accept their o⁄ers. Player 3 would join
project 2 and player 4 project 1 since to receive this o⁄er reveals them the corresponding
project￿ s high quality. Otherwise, each of them joins the other project.
The teams f1;3;5g and f2;4;7g form if both projects￿quality is low. If project 1￿ s
quality is high and project 2￿ s is low, project 1 ￿lls at t = 1 with players 3, 4 and 5, while
project leader 2 recruits player 7 at t = 1 and player 6 at T = 2: The teams f1;3;4;5g
and f2;6;7g form. If project 2￿ s quality is high and project 1￿ s low, project 2 ￿lls at t = 1
with players 3, 4 and 7, while project leader 1 recruits player 5 at t = 1 and player 6 at
T = 2: The teams f1;5;6g and f2;3;4;7g form. Finally, if both projects￿quality is high,
the teams at t = 1 are f1;4;5g and f2;3;7g: Both leaders o⁄er player 6 to join at T = 2:
He only receives two o⁄ers in this case. Hence, he updates his belief about both projects￿
quality to 1 and joins project 1, by A2:
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Figure 7: The SE depends on p
four which forms. He joins a low quality team of size three when both projects￿quality is
low. Hence, no other player￿ s expected payo⁄ is higher than his and he is most central.
Player 3 whose position seems to be symmetric to player 4￿ s receives a lower expected
payo⁄ than 4 since player 6, by A2; joins project 1 in case both projects￿quality is high.
4.2.3 Example 5: The SE depends on p
To ￿nd the unique SE can be involved, as is illustrated for the network depicted in Figure







2jb￿j2 for ￿ 2 P;
then, jb￿
￿(H)j = 10; jb￿
￿(L)j = 7 and ^ m￿ = 4: The leader of high quality project 1 aims
to recruit players 3 to 11 and that of high quality project 2 players 3 to 7 and 12 to 15.
Hence, C0
2:1 = f3;4;5;6;7g; BP1 = f3;6g and BP2 = f5;7g: Player 12 also belongs to C0
2:
Obviously, he is within reach of project 2 and joins it at t = 4 in case its quality is high.
However, if project 2￿ s quality is low and project 1￿ s high, project leader 1 recruits player
12 at T = 5: All other players are in C0
1 = f8;9;10;11;13;14;15g: The SE depends on
the value of _ p and three cases may occur.
Case 1: At t = 1; player 3 moves ￿rst and waits while, by A1 and SR, players 5, 7 and
15 join project 2 and player 8 project 1. Let teamt
￿ be the set of ￿￿ s contributors at the
end of period t: Then, team1
1 = f1;8g and team1
2 = f2;5;7;15g: At the end of period 2,
team2
1 = f1;8;9g and team2
2 = f2;4;5;7;14;15g: From period 3 on, the teams depend on
k 2 K: How they evolve is depicted in Table 1. The barrier players coordinate on project
2 and at t = 3 player 3 either join it (since then its quality is high) or project 1. At T = 5;
the teams are identical to those formed at t = 4; except of project 1 which includes player
12 if, and only if, kH
1 kL











1 f1;8;9;10g f1;3;8;9;10g same as same as
team3






1 f1;8;9;10;11g f1;3;6;8;9;10;11g same as same as
team4





Table 1: How the teams evolve in Case 1 of Example 5
Players 3 and 6 are most central. Players 4, 5 and 7 join a low quality project 2 in case
kH
1 kL
2 ; while 3 and 6 join high quality project 1 with one more contributor. Otherwise,
their payo⁄s coincide. All other players always join the same team, except of player 12
who, however, remains unrecruited in case kL
1 kL
2 :
It is left to show that players 4 and 5 do not deviate. Suppose ￿rst that player 5 waits
for an o⁄er from project 1 (instead of joining project 2). Then, player 3 updates his belief
about project 2￿ s quality to 0 and joins project 1 at t = 3: The teams at this point in time
are team3
1 = f1;3;8;9;10g and team3
2 = f2;7;13;14;15g: At t = 4; project leader 1 asks
players 6 and 11 if project 1￿ s quality is low and additionally player 4 (just in case he is
still available) if it is high. All players accept his o⁄er. Project leader 2 recruits player 12
who updates his belief about its quality to 1 (since he anticipates to be on the SE path).
At T = 5; player 5 receives project leader 2￿ s o⁄er for sure and project leader 1￿ s if, and
only if, its quality is high. Hence, he joins project 1 if o⁄ered and otherwise project 2.
Player 5￿ s deviation is pro￿table if his expected payo⁄is larger than or equal to the one
in the SE: (By A2; he aspires to join project 1 if the two payo⁄s are equal and deviates
from the SE:) Player 5￿ s payo⁄in both cases is depicted in Table 2. His expected payo⁄in
the SE is _ p￿5(10;kH
2 )+(1￿ _ p)￿5(7;kL
2 ): If he deviates it is _ p￿5(9;kH
1 )+(1￿ _ p)(_ p￿5(7;kH
2 )+
(1 ￿ _ p)￿5(7;kL
2 )): Substituting for the payo⁄ player 5 obtains in each case, the ￿rst term
is larger than the second if _ p > 41
42: Hence, player 5 does not deviate for _ p 2 (41
42;1):




2 ) = 50 ￿5(9;kH




2 ) = 24:5 ￿5(9;kH




2 ) = 50 ￿5(7;kH




2 ) = 24:5 ￿5(7;kL
2 ) = 24:5
Table 2: Player 5￿ s Payo⁄
Suppose that player 5 does not deviate, but that player 4 waits for an o⁄er from
project leader 1 (instead of joining project 2). Player 3 again updates his belief about
21project 2￿ s quality to 0 and joins project 1 at t = 3: Then, team3
1 = f1;3;8;9;10g and
team3
2 = f2;5;7;13;14;15g: At t = 4; project leader 1 recruits players 6 and 11 for sure,
and player 4 if, and only if, project 1￿ s quality is high. Project leader 2 recruits player 12
who updates his belief about its quality to 1 (since he anticipates to be on the SE path).
At T = 5; player 4 receives project leader 2￿ s o⁄er if its quality is high and accepts it if
he did not yet join project 1. Otherwise he remains unrecruited.
His expected payo⁄ in the SE is _ p￿4(10;kH
2 ) + (1 ￿ _ p)￿4(7;kL
2 ): If he deviates it is
_ p￿4(8;kH
1 ) + (1 ￿ _ p)_ p￿4(8;kH
2 ): Substituting for the payo⁄ player 4 obtains in each case,
the ￿rst term is larger than the second if 48_ p2￿70:5_ p+24:5 > 0: This inequality is ful￿lled
for _ p 2 (0;0:564)[(0:904;1): For this range of _ p player 4 joins project 2 at t = 2: (By A2;
player 4 aspires to join project 1 if this inequality is weak and deviates from the SE:)
If the inequalities derived for players 4 and 5 both hold, that is, for _ p 2 (41
42;1); players
4 and 5 do not deviate from the SE in Case 1. Otherwise, at least one of them would
deviate and a di⁄erent SE has to be found. If the inequality for player 5 is violated but
the one for player 4 not, that is, for _ p 2 (0;0:564) [ (0:904; 41
42]; Case 2 applies. Finally,
if the inequality for player 4 is violated, that is, for _ p 2 [0:564;0:904]; Case 3 applies
(independently of player 5￿ s inequality).
Case 2: If player 5 deviates, player 3 would wait until t = 4 and player 6 until T = 5
before joining project 1. Both join project 2 before if o⁄ered. This induces player 5 to join
project 2 at t = 1 since project 1￿ s o⁄er never reaches him. The game evolves as initially
described in Case 1, though players 3 and 6 join project 1 only at t = 4 and T = 5;
respectively, if project 2￿ s quality is low. This is a SE for _ p 2 (0;0:564) [ (0:904; 41
42]:
Case 3: In case player 4 would deviate from the SE derived in Cases 1 or 2, player 3
waits instead until T = 5 to join project 1 and player 4 joins project 2 at t = 2 since he
never receives an o⁄er from project 1. The game evolves as described in Case 1, though
players 3 and 6 join project 1 only at T = 5; if project 2￿ s quality is low. This is the
unique SE for _ p 2 [0:564;0:904]:
Finally, it is shown that player 3 never deviates in a SE (given any case) as long as
_ p = p1 = p2: If he waits at t = 1; his expected payo⁄is _ p￿3(10;kH
2 )+(1￿ _ p)[_ p￿3(8;kH
1 )+
(1 ￿ _ p)￿3(7;kL
1 )] while it is _ p￿3(10;kH
1 ) + (1 ￿ _ p)￿3(7;kL
1 ) if he joins project 1 at t = 1:
The ￿rst term is larger than or equal to the second if
_ p ￿3(10;kH
2 ) + (1 ￿ _ p) _ p ￿3(8;kH
1 ) + (1 ￿ _ p) (1 ￿ _ p) ￿3(7;kL
1 ) ￿
_ p ￿3(10;kH
1 ) + (1 ￿ _ p) ￿3(7;kL
1 ):
This simpli￿es to _ p ￿3(8;kH
1 ) + (1 ￿ _ p) ￿3(7;kL
1 ) ￿ ￿3(7;kL
1 ) and further to ￿3(8;kH
1 ) ￿
22￿3(7;kL
1 ): Thus, player 3 waits at t = 1 given any _ p 2 (0;1): Players 3 and 6 are most
central in Cases 2 and 3 as well since the same teams emerge as in Case 1.
4.3 Centrality Measure and Related Literature
Conceptually, the centrality measure proposed here is related with Freeman￿ s (1977) be-
tweeness centrality and Burt￿ s (1992) structural holes. However, the three measures usu-
ally select di⁄erent players as most central, such as in Example 2.
A player which ￿lls a structural hole obtains the highest payo⁄ since he brokers in-
formation or controls its ￿ ow between two groups. He receives an informational rent in
an environment in which information is complementary and cross fertilization of ideas
bene￿ts both groups. Burt￿ s concept is based on Freeman￿ s betweeness centrality which
measures the proportion of paths between two distinct players which contain a third one.
For example, in Figure 2, players 3 and 4 have the highest betweeness centrality if the
two project leaders are taken as reference since any path between them contains both
players. Nevertheless, player 4￿ s expected payo⁄ is lowest. If player 4 were connected to
both project leaders, his betweeness centrality would be highest. Then, players 3 and 4
obtain the highest expected payo⁄ as shown in the next section.
Whereas betweeness centrality is de￿ned purely with respect to the network, the con-
cept of structural holes requires an interpretation of the network. There are two groups
of players which can access each other only via a player who occupies a structural hole.
Each group is seen as a separate entity. Conversely, the centrality measure developed in
this paper depends on the TFG; and in particular, on the project leaders￿position in the
network. It takes into account the agents￿strategic considerations, that is, the project
leaders￿competition for contributors and the players￿intention to join together a high
quality project. Obviously, the assumptions of commitment, the projects￿equal payo⁄
division, A1; A2 and the agents￿￿xed order of moves are crucial to select the most central
players (see section 5 for a discussion of these assumptions).
The agents￿strategic behavior might prevent a player which is most central according
to Freeman or Burt, such as player 4 in Example 2, from taking advantage of his position.
In Example 1, player 3 is most central, while Freeman and Burt select players 3 and 4.20
According to Freeman￿ s betweeness centrality, players 7 and 8 are most central in Figure
4 of Example 3 while players 6 to 9 are most central in the TFG: In Figure 5 of Example
3, both measures select players 21 and 22 as most central. In Figure 6, all players have the
same betweeness centrality while player 4 is most central in the TFG: In Figure 7, players









Figure 8: Restricted Access
3 to 5 and 8 to 15 have the same betweeness centrality and player 4 might arguably ￿ll a
structural hole. However, in the TFG of Example 5 players 3 and 6 are most central.
4.4 Welfare Implications
In a SE ine¢ cient unemployment may arise. Due to the network structure a project
leader who wants to recruit contributors may not have access to free players while there
are unrecruited players which would like to join him. This occurs, for example, if only one
project leader can access category 2, such as in a star whose hub is the only barrier player
while two of the spokes are project leaders. Suppose that in Figure 3 various players
are added to the tree that originates in project leader 2. Then, ine¢ cient unemployment
obtains in the SE; if project leader 1 needs more than one player and project leader 2
leaves some players in the tree unrecruited. Example 6 is another instance of this.
Example 6: Restricted Access
In the network depicted in Figure 8, the project leaders are on one side of the network
and the players on the other. Let T = 3; p1 = p2; kH






2jb￿j2 for ￿ 2 P; then, jb￿
￿(H)j = 6; jb￿
￿(L)j = 4; ^ m￿ = 3 for ￿ 2 PL and
C0
2 = C0
2:1 = f3;4;5;8;9g with BP1 = f3g and BP2 = f8g:
In the unique SE; at t = 1; player 3 accepts project leader 1￿ s o⁄er and player 8 rejects
project leader 2￿ s. At t = 2; project 1 includes players 4 and 8 in any case, and at T = 3;
players 5 and 9 if, and only if, project 1￿ s quality is high. Project 2￿ s only contributor is
its leader. Players 6, 7, 10 and 11 belong to category 0 throughout the game and C0
1 = ;:
Players 3, 4 and 8 are most central since they join project 1 independently of its quality.
Although these are stylized examples, in reality, such situations frequently occur as is
implied by the empirical results in Br￿derl and Preisend￿rfer (1998) and Blumberg and
Pfann (2001). A remedy to ￿x this ine¢ ciency in the model is to link a project leader with
unrecruited players. However, links may be costly and the theoretical analysis of a network
24formation game that precedes the team formation game would yield useful insights. In
reality, the network structure is usually not commonly known. Nevertheless, it might not
be di¢ cult and costly to provide platforms for existing and potential entrepreneurs to from
additional links, such as fares where local banks, customers, suppliers and representatives
of the local administration o⁄er their advice and availability to from links.
From a social point of view it is desirable to include more players in a project than its
leader aspires to do (due to the concavity of the payo⁄ function and the assumption of
equal sharing among project participants). In a SE; even this number may not be reached.
Moreover, the players frequently coordinate on one project. One group of barrier players
waits in order to induce the other one to join its project (immediately) and thereby to
reveal the project￿ s quality. This is ine¢ cient if once one team is ￿lled the other may
pick up the remaining players, but its barrier players prevent it from accessing available
players. This ine¢ ciency is inherent in the SE: Both groups of barrier players would like
to obtain information about the more distant project￿ s quality before taking a decision.
In general, more dense networks, that is, networks in which there are more links and
a lower diameter, fare better in terms of welfare, as de￿ned by the sum of all agents￿
payo⁄s, since players are more easily accessible and more players can be reached before
T: However, the project leaders￿position matters and a newly created link may allow one
of them to "steal" players from the other which might decrease welfare. A change in the
network structure may increase welfare as shown in section 5.
In case more project leaders are added to the network, any player￿ s expected payo⁄
is nondecreasing. Although, the competition for players becomes more severe and this
harms project leaders. In reality, there are few examples, such as Silicon Valley, in which
such a process is self-reinforcing. Many skilled individuals are competed for by many
projects but this attracts more skilled individuals and entrepreneurs. Projects may go
bust and release players again. As a consequence, the network is dynamic and its structure
is constantly changing. In most other places all over the world, the network is not that
dynamic and competition between entrepreneurs is di⁄erent as illustrated by Br￿derl and
Preisend￿rfer (1998). The model developed in this paper applies to these situations in
which the network is roughly stable over a long period of time.
5 Discussion
In this section, various assumptions and extensions of the model are discussed.
Assumptions to obtain a unique SE: The assumptions to select a unique SE
25are restrictive. However, the entire set of SE can be identi￿ed. First, all results are
given when the agents move in increasing order of their indexes. For any other order of
moves, the corresponding SE can be found￿ Proposition 2 is valid for any order of moves.
Moreover, Assumptions 1 and 2 can be adapted to break an indi⁄erence in any possible
way. For each set of assumptions, the corresponding unique SE is derivable. Once the
entire set of SE for a given TFG is identi￿ed, one can be selected according to certain
criteria, such as welfare maximization. Then, comparative statics would be meaningful.
Finally, consider a change of the assumptions in the preceding examples. A di⁄erent
order of moves does not a⁄ect the SE in Figure 4 of Example 3 since coordination does
not take place. In case coordination takes place, the total welfare in the TFG is fre-
quently unchanged when the assumptions are altered while each player￿ s payo⁄ changes.
In Example 1, player 4 would wait at t = 1 if he moved before 3. In Example 2, players
5 and 6 would wait at t = 1 as long as both of them move before player 3. In Example
4, a di⁄erent SE arises for each set of assumptions, though the total welfare is identical
in each case. In Figure 5 of Example 3, the order of moves does not a⁄ect the SE while
a change of A2 would make players 21 and 22 coordinate on project 2. In Example 5, a
change in the assumptions has a bigger impact on the SE which also depends on _ p:
Informational Assumptions. It is possible to relax the informational requirements
for project leaders. Initially, each may be restricted to know his direct neighbors. After
recruiting one of them, he gets to know the recruited neighbor￿ s neighbor(s) and so on.
In this way the project leader￿ s behavior implied by A1 arises endogenously in a SE:
The players￿information about the network could be restricted as well. If the players
are also categorized for low quality projects, then a player only needs to know in which
category he is given the realized project qualities. To know his exact position in the
network is not necessary. This implies that it is not essential in reality to be linked with
the most focal agent(s), such as a project leader or barrier player.
If all agents observe all o⁄ers and replies and not only those involving them, then the
players update their beliefs earlier, and the SE is trivial.
The Categorization in more General Cases. The players￿categorization extends
to more than two quality levels per project and to more than two projects. More categories
and intersections between them exist and a player￿ s belief updating is more complicated,
though qualitatively the result is similar. If there are more than two projects, for any
number of quality levels, the number of categories is equal to the number of projects
since some players initially might expect to join each project with a positive probability.
Players drop to lower categories over time or join a project and all players which expect
26to receive a certain number of o⁄ers might do so from di⁄erent projects. Hence, for each
category there is a subcategory with di⁄erent project combinations. In general, a unique
SE can be selected if analogous assumptions to A1 and A2 hold.
Finally, suppose that each agent is equally likely to be selected as project leader.
First, one is drawn from the set of agents and then the other among the remaining agents
(in order to avoid that one agent obtains two projects). The ensuing game could be
solved analogously to the TFG: Additionally, each player would take into account the
probability with which each other agent is a project leader and form corresponding beliefs
(which enter his expected payo⁄function). The coordination feature would be lost unless
T is quite large and a player does not lose the option to join one project by waiting for a
second o⁄er. A project leader￿ s optimal strategy would be unchanged.
Changes in the Network Structure. If links are added or destroyed in network ￿;
the centrality of players may change and a di⁄erent SE may arise. In order to illustrate
this, consider Example 2 with T = 3 and p1 = p2; but suppose that in the network
depicted in Figure 2 player 4 is connected to both project leaders. Then, all players are
barrier players but only player 4 is one of both projects. In the unique SE; at t = 1;
players 5 and 6 join project 2. Its leader asks them independently of its quality. If project
2￿ s quality is high, player 4 joins it as well at t = 1 and player 3 at t = 2: If it is low,
players 3 and 4 join project 1 at T = 3 since both update their beliefs about project 2￿ s
quality to 0. Players 3 and 4 obtain a higher expected payo⁄ than 5 and 6 since they
have two chances to join a high quality project.
Commitment. If a player need not commit, he accepts the ￿rst o⁄er he receives but
then reneges on his promise if he gets a better o⁄er. Since all players prefer to join the
same project, once the two projects have recruited neighbors in category 2, one group of
players would renege on its promises.
In Example 2, given T = 3 and no commitment, player 3 joins project 1 and players
5 and 6 project 2 at t = 1: If o⁄ered, player 4 joins project 2 at t = 2 since this reveals
him its high quality. Player 3 then joins it at T = 3: If player 4 is not asked by project 2
at t = 2 (since its quality is low), he joins project 1 instead. If, and only if, project 1￿ s
quality is high, players 5 and 6 then renege on their initial promise to project leader 2
and join project 1 at T = 3: All players obtain the same payo⁄. Either all of them join
the same high quality project or two low quality projects each with three agents form.
Each project leader would then recruit players out of reach for the other since they
stay with him. Players in category 2 are only recruited if no others are accessible. If a
project leader thereby reveals his project￿ s high quality, his chance to keep them increases.
27If project leaders need not commit either, they would initially pretend to have a high
quality project. At T; they then discard players in case the project￿ s quality is low. Hence,
the players only get to know a project￿ s quality once they cannot react to it any more.
In reality, project leaders and players frequently commit. Usually, contracts are signed
for a certain period and can only be cancelled at early enough prior notice. If one party
breaks a contract, ￿nes may be imposed on it. Moreover, in many industries after leaving
a company, important employees are prevented from changing to a competitor, supplier
or customer for some time.
6 Final Remarks
This paper studies team formation in a network taking into account social ties of eco-
nomic agents. Two projects compete for players which have imperfect information about
their quality. A unique pure strategy SE always exists if certain conditions hold. The
players are categorized according to their position in the network relative to that of the
two projects and according to whether they may receive two, one or no o⁄ers. The cat-
egorization is related with a player￿ s SE strategy and his expected and realized payo⁄.
Moreover, a new centrality measure is derived, which is unrelated to existent concepts in
the network literature. Usually, a group of players is most central.
The model￿ s solution implies that economic agents only need to locate themselves in
the right category, but that their exact position does not matter. Unemployment may
prevail in a SE; although project leaders still want to recruit. In a SE; the players
may delay their decision to join a closer project in order to solicit information about the
more distant￿ s quality. This behavior is individually rational, though it may be socially
ine¢ cient if it prevents a team from reaching its optimal size.
This model can be extended in several ways. The players￿skill level may be heteroge-
nous. A project leader may have to recruit several low skilled players just to access a high
skilled one. The agents may choose an e⁄ort level, which is a continuous variable, or each
can allocate an amount of time or money to various projects. Bargaining among project
participants could take place or a project leader could post a wage. Moreover, a market
for the teams￿products might exist. The team which produces earlier captures a higher
market share, while the other is more successful if its product￿ s quality is higher and it
o⁄ers a larger quantity. Though this depends on whether the products are substitutes or
complements. Finally, a network formation game that precedes the TFG can be analyzed.
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